時(shí) 間:
依據(jù)代理理論,董事會(huì)的主要作用是代表股東監(jiān)督管理者。這一理論觀點(diǎn)受到管理學(xué)界的一些批判,例如它的前提假設(shè)被質(zhì)疑,其次是實(shí)證研究結(jié)果與代理理論的預(yù)測(cè)不一致。基于企業(yè)法律理論(Heracleous & Lan, 2012; Lan & Heracleous, 2010),我們提出董事首要觀(Director Primacy Perspective),認(rèn)為公司董事會(huì)是一個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)生產(chǎn)過程,董事會(huì)成員扮演著“調(diào)和者”(mediator)的角色,履行著“自動(dòng)受托人”(automatic fiduciaries)的職責(zé)。使用中國(guó)上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),我們通過考察董事會(huì)異議(否決票)這一現(xiàn)象,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)董事會(huì)異質(zhì)性和盈余管理這兩個(gè)因素會(huì)增加董事會(huì)出現(xiàn)異議的可能性;董事會(huì)異議會(huì)降低了企業(yè)的短期績(jī)效,管理者采用的“偏離戰(zhàn)略”(deviant strategy)在這一關(guān)系中起到了中介作用。
Agency theory suggests that the main role of a board is monitoring the behavior of managers on behalf of shareholders. However, this perspective has been criticized for its underlying assumptions and the inconsistencies between theoretical and empirical findings. Based on legal theories of the firm (Heracleous & Lan, 2012; Lan & Heracleous, 2010), we propose a director primacy perspective in which the corporate board is a team production wherein the directors play a mediating role to fulfill the automatic fiduciaries. Using a novel dataset of publicly listed Chinese firms, we examine this alternative perspective through the board dissent phenomenon that is seldom explored in the literature but often occurs in the boardroom. We find two determinant factors that increase the likelihood of board dissent, namely board heterogeneity and earnings management. While board dissent reduces a firm’s short-term performance, we further find that this relationship is mediated by deviant strategy adopted by the manager.
主講人介紹:
孫黎教授執(zhí)教于堪薩斯城密蘇里大學(xué)管理學(xué)院全球創(chuàng)新與創(chuàng)業(yè)系,博士生課程導(dǎo)師。達(dá)拉斯德州大學(xué)全球戰(zhàn)略管理博士,香港中文大學(xué)哲學(xué)碩士、中國(guó)人民大學(xué)學(xué)士,浙江宣平人。他對(duì)戰(zhàn)略管理、國(guó)際商務(wù)與創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)業(yè)有深入的研究,在國(guó)際頂級(jí)學(xué)術(shù)期刊和國(guó)內(nèi)最具影響力的商業(yè)期刊發(fā)表大量論文。他的論文發(fā)表在Strategic Management Journal、Journal of International Business Studies、Journal of Management Studies、Journal of World Business、Academy of Management Perspectives、Asia Pacific Journal of Management、Multinational Business Review、Asian Case Research Journal等期刊,其中大多為對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)所做的研究。孫黎教授著有《復(fù)盤:反思創(chuàng)新與商業(yè)模式》、《站在美國(guó)陽(yáng)臺(tái)看中國(guó):企業(yè)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和全球道路》等十余本專著。同時(shí),他是《IT經(jīng)理世界》、《北大商業(yè)評(píng)論》、《中歐商業(yè)評(píng)論》等刊物的特約撰稿人,并在《清華管理評(píng)論》等商業(yè)期刊發(fā)表文章。孫黎教授擁有11年的創(chuàng)業(yè)、融資和咨詢經(jīng)驗(yàn)。1998年,成為中國(guó)上市公司中最年輕的執(zhí)行董事;曾經(jīng)激情創(chuàng)業(yè),他創(chuàng)辦的高科技企業(yè)于2001年成功引入Intel的投資。