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講座內容：

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 講座題目：Multi-Decision Maker Systems Modeling in Air Transportation（航空運輸領域的多決策系統模型）

 主講人介紹：Vikrant教授現在Dartmouth College任教。其研究領域包括最優化理論、博弈論以及多智能體復雜系統在交通、醫療行業的應用。Vikrant教授是Management Science，Operations Research等期刊的審稿人，并在Transportation Research Part A，Transportation Science等期刊發表多篇論文。Vikrant教授從麻省理工學院畢業并取得了交通運輸和運籌學雙碩士學位及系統學博士學位，在此期間，他曾獲多個獎項及榮譽：美國交通部資助的研究生科研獎金，麻省理工大學總統獎學金、擇優獎學金等；歐美研發研討會最佳論文獎，其博士論文曾獲得Pikarsky最佳博士論文獎。

 講座內容：美國國家航空系統（NAS）是一個包含航空公司、乘客及系統運營商的涉及多主體，多目標和主體間的相互作用的復雜系統。NAS的擁堵和延誤不僅造成運營成本的額外增加和盈利能力的下降，而且致使服務水平下降以及NAS資源的低效利用。Vikrant教授將利用博弈論模型與我們分享并探討如何制定緩解航空擁堵的管理機制？

 （附英文摘要：The US National Aviation System (NAS) is a complex system with multiple, interacting agents including airlines, passengers, and system operators, each with somewhat different objectives and incentives. These interactions determine the state of the system. NAS congestion and delays result in additional operating costs and reduced profitability for the airlines, a decrease in the level-of-service to passengers, and a decrease in the efficiency of NAS resource utilization. We evaluate the congestion impacts on the NAS stakeholders while explicitly accounting for their interactions and propose congestion mitigation mechanisms that are beneficial to these different stakeholders.

 First, we measure the extent to which the NAS capacity is being inefficiently utilized and show that at the current level of passenger demand, delays are avoidable to a large extent if we control the negative effects of competitive airline scheduling practices. Then, we develop a statistical framework using data fusion and discrete choice modeling for generating disaggregate passenger travel data, and characterize the impacts of airline network structures, schedules and operational decisions on passenger delays. Next, we propose a parametric game-theoretic model consistent with the most popular characterization of frequency competition, and prove that the level of congestion in a system of competing airlines is an increasing function of the number of competing airlines, the ratio of average fare to operating cost per seat and the frequency sensitivity of passenger demand. Finally, we propose a game-theoretic model of frequency competition under slot constraints, and devise and assess new administrative strategies for congestion mitigation. We show that a small reduction in the total number of allocated slots translates into a substantial reduction in delays, and also a considerable improvement in airlines‘ profits.）

 預約人數：70人