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講座題目：Multi-Decision Maker Systems Modeling in Air Transportation（航空運輸領(lǐng)域的多決策系統(tǒng)模型）
主講人介紹：Vikrant教授現(xiàn)在Dartmouth College任教。其研究領(lǐng)域包括最優(yōu)化理論、博弈論以及多智能體復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)在交通、醫(yī)療行業(yè)的應(yīng)用。Vikrant教授是Management Science，Operations Research等期刊的審稿人，并在Transportation Research Part A，Transportation Science等期刊發(fā)表多篇論文。Vikrant教授從麻省理工學(xué)院畢業(yè)并取得了交通運輸和運籌學(xué)雙碩士學(xué)位及系統(tǒng)學(xué)博士學(xué)位，在此期間，他曾獲多個獎項及榮譽：美國交通部資助的研究生科研獎金，麻省理工大學(xué)總統(tǒng)獎學(xué)金、擇優(yōu)獎學(xué)金等；歐美研發(fā)研討會最佳論文獎，其博士論文曾獲得Pikarsky最佳博士論文獎。
講座內(nèi)容：美國國家航空系統(tǒng)（NAS）是一個包含航空公司、乘客及系統(tǒng)運營商的涉及多主體，多目標(biāo)和主體間的相互作用的復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)。NAS的擁堵和延誤不僅造成運營成本的額外增加和盈利能力的下降，而且致使服務(wù)水平下降以及NAS資源的低效利用。Vikrant教授將利用博弈論模型與我們分享并探討如何制定緩解航空擁堵的管理機(jī)制？
（附英文摘要：The US National Aviation System (NAS) is a complex system with multiple, interacting agents including airlines, passengers, and system operators, each with somewhat different objectives and incentives. These interactions determine the state of the system. NAS congestion and delays result in additional operating costs and reduced profitability for the airlines, a decrease in the level-of-service to passengers, and a decrease in the efficiency of NAS resource utilization. We evaluate the congestion impacts on the NAS stakeholders while explicitly accounting for their interactions and propose congestion mitigation mechanisms that are beneficial to these different stakeholders.
First, we measure the extent to which the NAS capacity is being inefficiently utilized and show that at the current level of passenger demand, delays are avoidable to a large extent if we control the negative effects of competitive airline scheduling practices. Then, we develop a statistical framework using data fusion and discrete choice modeling for generating disaggregate passenger travel data, and characterize the impacts of airline network structures, schedules and operational decisions on passenger delays. Next, we propose a parametric game-theoretic model consistent with the most popular characterization of frequency competition, and prove that the level of congestion in a system of competing airlines is an increasing function of the number of competing airlines, the ratio of average fare to operating cost per seat and the frequency sensitivity of passenger demand. Finally, we propose a game-theoretic model of frequency competition under slot constraints, and devise and assess new administrative strategies for congestion mitigation. We show that a small reduction in the total number of allocated slots translates into a substantial reduction in delays, and also a considerable improvement in airlines‘ profits.）
預(yù)約人數(shù)：70人
修改日期：2016-6-1
