Capacity Limit, Demand Uncertainty and Reverse Price Discrimination
時間：2025年6月6日（周五）上午 10:30-12:00
地點：思源東樓821
報告人簡介：鄭捷，山東大學經濟研究院教授、博士生導師；山東省“泰山學者計劃”特聘專家，入選國家重大人才工程；山東大學理論與實驗經濟學研究中心（CREATE）主任。清華大學經濟學學士、碩士，美國華盛頓大學經濟學碩士、博士。國際學術期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主編，擔任多份SSCI/SCI期刊客座主編。研究領域包括信息經濟學、實驗經濟學、行為經濟學、產業經濟學，主持過多項國家自然科學基金項目（結題連續獲“特優”評價）。研究工作發表于《經濟研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等期刊。擔任中國信息經濟學會常務理事、中國運籌學會博弈論分會常務理事、中國行為與實驗經濟學論壇聯合秘書長、中國微觀經濟理論論壇學術委員會委員、中國經濟學年會微觀理論與行為經濟專業委員會委員等學術職務。
報告摘要：The third price discrimination typically refers to firms’ pricing strategies in which the prices received by consumers are positively related to their willingness to pay. We show in this paper that when there is capacity limit and demand uncertainty, a reverse price discrimination can occur as a monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy. In our benchmark setup, a monopoly seller provides one type of products to two buyers, whose willingness to pay for the product differs. We assume that the monopoly seller can perfectly conduct price discrimination on the two buyers, and there is a capacity limit regarding how many units of products the seller can provide per day. In addition, the demand uncertainty is introduced into the model such that the buyers’ likelihood to consume has a linear functional form that depends on the price they each receive. We identify the condition under which in equilibrium there is reverse price discrimination. We also extend the current model to the multiple consumers case and the more general demand function case. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the implementation of price discrimination.
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