?Declare or Commit? Pre-Announcing Contributions to a Public Good?
時間：2025年6月6日（周五）上午 9:00-10:30
地點：思源東樓821? ?
報告人簡介：Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien（連暐虹），山東大學經濟研究院教授、博士生導師；山東大學特聘教授、國家自然科學基金委外籍優青；山東大學理論與實驗經濟學研究中心（CREATE）聯席主任。美國衛爾斯利女子學院學士，美國加利福尼亞大學圣地亞哥分校碩士、博士。擔任North American Journal of Economics and Finance等多份國際學術期刊客座編輯與編委成員。研究領域包括行為經濟學、實驗經濟學、應用微觀經濟學，研究主題涉及合作互惠、參照依賴、現時偏誤、代表性偏誤等重要行為現象。先后主持過國家自然科學基金項目、教育部科研項目、香港研究資助局項目。目前已有論文發表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Economic Journal、Games and Economic Behavior等國際知名期刊。曾獲"中國信息經濟學2016青年創新獎"、"中國信息經濟學2018青年創新獎"和"中國信息經濟學2011-2015理論貢獻獎"。
報告摘要：How to promote cooperation in social dilemmas is both academically challenging and practically important. We introduce a voluntary commitment mechanism for public goods provision which is highly effective in the laboratory, and can be considered for implementation in problems such as climate agreements. We study a 2x2 design of treatments varying by whether players have to commit to or merely declare their contributions (declare vs. commit), and whether the declaration/commitment is at the individual or group level (individual vs. group). We find that declarations alone are ineffective, and that there is no relationshipbetween individuals’ declarations and contributions, resulting in poor outcomes. In the Individual Commitment treatment, while subjects adhere to their commitments, the overall commitment level is low. In all of these treatments, payoffs are decreasing in contributions made, and a substantial static norm of zero contributions develops. Only the Group Commitment treatment succeeds in achieving an increasing pattern of commitment and contributions, and converges rapidly to a predominant norm of full contributions.?
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瀏覽次數：2828
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