国产AV无码专区亚洲AV琪琪,国产免费牲交视频免费下载,亚洲精品综合在线影院,337p日本欧洲亚洲大胆

知微識斷 秉道傳馨

時(shí) 間：

【時(shí)空經(jīng)濟(jì)沙龍第117期（上）】 Declare or Commit? Pre-Announcing Contributions to a Public Good
2025年06月04日 信息來源：劉瑜 瀏覽次數(shù)：482
  • 講座人：
  • 講座時(shí)間： 06月06日 09:00--10:30
  • 講座地點(diǎn)：北京交通大學(xué)思源東樓821會(huì)議室
  • 預(yù)約人數(shù)：
已過期
講座內(nèi)容：

【時(shí)空經(jīng)濟(jì)沙龍第117期（上）】
?Declare or Commit? Pre-Announcing Contributions to a Public Good?

時(shí)間：2025年6月6日（周五）上午 9:00-10:30
地點(diǎn)：思源東樓821? ?
報(bào)告人簡介：Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien（連暐虹），山東大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院教授、博士生導(dǎo)師；山東大學(xué)特聘教授、國家自然科學(xué)基金委外籍優(yōu)青；山東大學(xué)理論與實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究中心（CREATE）聯(lián)席主任。美國衛(wèi)爾斯利女子學(xué)院學(xué)士，美國加利福尼亞大學(xué)圣地亞哥分校碩士、博士。擔(dān)任North American Journal of Economics and Finance等多份國際學(xué)術(shù)期刊客座編輯與編委成員。研究領(lǐng)域包括行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、實(shí)驗(yàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、應(yīng)用微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，研究主題涉及合作互惠、參照依賴、現(xiàn)時(shí)偏誤、代表性偏誤等重要行為現(xiàn)象。先后主持過國家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目、教育部科研項(xiàng)目、香港研究資助局項(xiàng)目。目前已有論文發(fā)表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Economic Journal、Games and Economic Behavior等國際知名期刊。曾獲"中國信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)2016青年創(chuàng)新獎(jiǎng)"、"中國信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)2018青年創(chuàng)新獎(jiǎng)"和"中國信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)2011-2015理論貢獻(xiàn)獎(jiǎng)"。
報(bào)告摘要：How to promote cooperation in social dilemmas is both academically challenging and practically important. We introduce a voluntary commitment mechanism for public goods provision which is highly effective in the laboratory, and can be considered for implementation in problems such as climate agreements. We study a 2x2 design of treatments varying by whether players have to commit to or merely declare their contributions (declare vs. commit), and whether the declaration/commitment is at the individual or group level (individual vs. group). We find that declarations alone are ineffective, and that there is no relationshipbetween individuals’ declarations and contributions, resulting in poor outcomes. In the Individual Commitment treatment, while subjects adhere to their commitments, the overall commitment level is low. In all of these treatments, payoffs are decreasing in contributions made, and a substantial static norm of zero contributions develops. Only the Group Commitment treatment succeeds in achieving an increasing pattern of commitment and contributions, and converges rapidly to a predominant norm of full contributions.?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?